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Abstract—Due to the lack of quantitative information and
for cost-efficiency purpose, most risk assessment methods use
partially ordered values (e.g. high, medium, low) as risk indica-
tors. In practice it is common to validate risk scales by asking
stakeholders whether they make sense. This way of validation
is subjective, thus error prone. If the metrics are wrong (not
meaningful), then they may lead system owners to distribute
security investments inefficiently. Therefore, when validating risk
assessment methods it is important to validate the meaningfulness
of the risk scales that they use. In this paper we investigate
how to validate the meaningfulness of risk indicators based on
measurement theory. Furthermore, to analyze the applicability of
measurement theory to risk indicators, we analyze the indicators
used by a particular risk assessment method specially developed
for assessing confidentiality risks in networks of organizations.
Index Terms—security; risk assessment; measurement
I. INTRODUCTION
IT risk metrics are designed to monitor, analyze and man-
age risk related attributes of system entities, e.g. impact of
unauthorized disclosure of a certain information asset. Risk
experts commonly measure these attributes with partially
ordered values (e.g. high, medium, low). This is due to
the unavailability of sufficient and complete event data and
also to the limited availability of resources (time, money) to
do the risk assessment. To determine risk, risk assessment
(RA) methods aggregate these values with merge operators.
A merge operator defines a qualitative ordering over each
possible measurement combination. We furthermore call the
values aggregated with merge operators risk indicators. Risk
indicators are also partially ordered values.
In practice, risk indicators are validated by asking stake-
holders’ commitment. This way of validation is based on
subjective opinions of stakeholders, but not on analysis of
meaningfulness of the indicators. If risk indicators are not
meaningful, they may mislead system owners at their security
investment decisions. For instance, in an extended enterprise
this may mean over investing in service level agreements or
obtaining a contract that provides a lower security level than
the system requires. Therefore, it is important to validate the
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meaningfulness of the risk indicators. This means testing first
the meaningfulness of each indicator and then the meaning-
fulness of each merge operator.
Testing the construct validity and aggregation validity of
checklist-based methods is usually trivial. However, as the
complexity of an RA method increases, the number of risk
indicators and merge operations increases as well. Conse-
quently, validating the meaningfulness of the risk indicators
that sophisticated RA methods use becomes challenging.
The goal of this paper is to use measurement [10] theory
investigate how to validate the meaningfulness of risk indi-
cators and merge operators. In particular, the following two
questions will be investigated: (Q1) Is measurement theory
applicable to such a resource-constrained critical field such as
RA? and (Q2) Is measurement theory based validation of risk
indicators repeatable?
In this paper we present a road map for validating the
meaningfulness of risk indicators. We furthermore analyze the
applicability of the measurement theory to risk indicators by
testing the indicator used by the confidentiality risk assessment
method CRAC++ [9].
Although meaningfulness of software measures is analyzed
by many researchers, e.g. [2], [4]–[6], analyzing the validity
of IT security risk measures is relatively new. Research in this
field focuses on how to define meaningfully security measures,
e.g. [5], and how to test their relevance for IT security risk,
e.g. [7], rather than how to validate the measures proposed by
available methods. To the best of our knowledge this is the
first approach that aims to validate the meaningfulness of IT
security risk indicators based on measurement theory.
II. MEASUREMENT THEORY
Most of these concepts of measurement theory are in-
troduced by Stevens [10] and used in software engineering
context first by Baker et al. [1].
A metric is a value that results from measuring a certain
attribute of an entity being investigated. From here on we
refer to the value as measurement. It facilitates non-subjective
decision making and improves performance through time
efficient mapping of value to scales.
An entity is a logical or physical object, such as an appli-
cation or a work station, or an event, such as an incident [5].
An attribute on the other hand is a feature of an entity, such
as the impact of an incident. By assigning values to attributes
one has to consider the representation theory of measurement.
This means that the assignment of values must correspond to
all empirical relations about the entities and their attribute.
Depending on the empirical relations among the measure-
ments Stevens [10] classifies them in four main scale types,
i.e. nominal scale, ordinal scale, interval scale, and ratio scale.
Scale types define the arithmetic operations one can use to
analyze values that are mapped to certain scales (Table I).
TABLE I
CLASSES OF MEASUREMENT SCALES.
Scale Type preserve
order
magnitude admissible
arithmetic
operations
Nominal scale no no none
Ordinal scale yes monotonic increasing none
Interval scale yes positive linear +,-
Ratio scale yes positive geometric +,-,*,/
A nominal scale defines a classification schema that consist
of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories. There
is no order among these categories, therefore none of the pos-
sible arithmetic operations are applicable to the measurements
from this scale. This type of scale can be used for instance to
categorize attackers according to their capabilities.
An ordinal scale allows arranging the variable categories
in sequences with a monotonically increasing magnitude.
However there is no precise information on the magnitude of
the differences between these variables. Therefore, arithmetic
operations are still not applicable to attributes belonging to
this scale. Most of the risk measurements, such as criticality
of an IT-component classified as marginal–minor–moderate–
catastrophic, belong to this scale.
An interval scale extends the ordinal scale by indicating the
exact differences. The magnitude of the difference among the
variables of this scale is positive linear. Accordingly, addition
and subtraction are permitted arithmetic operation among the
variables. Risk indicators for which quantitative information
is available (such as number of IT-components and number of
instances of an information asset) belong to this scale.
A ratio scale extends the interval scale by allowing to cap-
ture positive and negative values. The magnitude between the
variable categories of this scale are positive geometric. Thus,
values that belong to this scale type can be transformed by
multiplying each value by a constant. All arithmetic operations
are permitted among the variables of this scale.
Herrmann [5] differentiates among three types of measure-
ments: ratio, proportion, and percentage. A ratio measurement
(different from ratio scale) compares two quantities that are
from distinct populations. If they are from the same popula-
tion then the measurement is of type proportion. Percentage
converts proportion to terms of per hundred units.
Herrmann [5] argues that to prevent subjectivity all measure-
ments should be collected according to the same quantification
process. Fenton and Pfleeger [3] differentiate between two
kinds of quantifications processes: direct quantification and
calculation.
Direct quantification assigns values to attributes of entities
directly, e.g. quantifying the number of incidents. In this way
it maps the facts of the empirical world to the indicators of
the mathematical world. Whereas, calculation is an indirect
quantification, which involves aggregating several attributes of
an entity, to gain new knowledge on that entity. For instance to
provide additional knowledge “expected impact of an incident”
on entity “impact”, one may aggregate the penalties to be paid,
recovery costs and image loss.
Fenton and Pleeger [3] argue that a statement involving
measurement is meaningful if its represents some real world
phenomena and doe not change after applying any admissible
transformations. Kitchenham et al. [6] elaborate on this state-
ment by arguing that for a measurement to be meaningful the
correlation among the facts should be preserved also among
the indicators (construct validity), and no other operations
of scales than the permitted ones should be performed on
indicators (aggregation validity).
does a measurement has a truth value? It is not a proposition.
I would say that a measurement is an object in the mathe-
matical world (e.g. a number, or a symbol) that represents a
phenomenon (e.g. an attribute of an entity) in the real world.
The requirement on calculations seems to be that the output of
a calculation must be a mathematical objects that represents
some relevant real world phenomenon.
Furthermore, there are four key characteristics that a con-
struct should obey to be meaningful: accuracy; precision;
completeness; and correctness. Accuracy shows how well in-
dividual or average measurements agree with a true value. Re-
peatability of accurate measures are captured with precision. In
other words, precision shows how well identically performed
measurements agree with each other, or how small the variance
is. Precision analyzes the variabilities in the test environment,
such as human error or not paying attention to detail. Com-
pleteness analyzes whether a measurement measures what it
is intended to measure. It depends on the completeness and
coherence of the measurement process. Finally, correctness
analyzes if the data is collected exactly as it is described by the
method. The more formal a measurement process is defined
the more correct results it delivers.
III. VALIDATION ROAD MAP
In this section we present a road map for validating the
meaningfulness of the risk indicators of complex RA methods.
In the following we describe the activities of the steps that the
validation road map consists of.
a) Step 1: Eliciting information: The aim of this step is
to elicit a list of entities, a list of attributes of these entities
(risk indicators) that the RA method measures, and the merge
operators with which the RA method “calculates” some of the
indicators.
b) Step 2: Analyzing Construct Validity: The aim of this
step is to analyze the meaningfulness of risk indicators that
are identified in step 1. In this step we first determine to
which scale type (i.e. nominal scale, ordinal scale, interval
scale and ratio scale) each indicator belongs, then analyze
how well each risk indicator satisfies the key characteristics
of meaningful measurements (i.e. accuracy, precision, validity
and correctness).
c) Step 3: Analyzing Aggregation Validity: Finally we
analyze the meaningfulness of the merge operations that are
identified in Step 1. This means we identify possible arithmetic
operations each merge operator is allowed to use based on the
scale of the measurements that are aggregated.
Commonly risk is presented as a single value that is
aggregated of two entities, e.g. likelihood and impact. For
instance if two constructs are impact and likelihood with
respective construct measures high and medium, then applying
a merge operator to combine these two measures may define
the measurement of risk construct as high. A merge operator
is necessary because it is not possible to combine qualitative
values, with arithmetical functions. There is a partial order
between qualitative values of each construct measurement.
This order needs to be respected by defining merge operators.
Accordingly by comparing two risk values r1 = (l1, i1) and
r2 = (l2, i2), we can say that r1 is superior to r2 if and only
if l1 ≥ l2 and i1 ≥ i2.
IV. APPLICATION
In this section we demonstrate how the three steps can be
applied to CRAC++ method.
A. Eliciting information from CRAC++
Based on the formalizations of CRAC++ we elicited 11 risk
indicators (as presented in Table II) and two merge operations.
TABLE II
RISK INDICATORS OF CRAC++
Indicator ID Attribute Entity
I01 confidentiality value information asset
I02 number of instances information asset
I03 homogeneity information asset
I04 number of capabilities threat agent
I05 number of conditions vulnerability
I06 level of mitigation countermeasures
I07 impact information asset
I08 total impact IT component
I09 ease of exploiting vulnerabilities vulnerability
I10 ease of accessing one component threat agent
I11 protection level of a component IT component
Indicators I01, I02, I03, I04, I05 and I06 are direct quan-
tifications. I01, confidentiality value, indicates the business
criticality of entity information asset from the perspective of
the system owner. I02, number of instances, is the attribute of
entity information asset and measures the number of instances
that belong to an information asset, e.g. if client data is
an information asset, and there are information records that
belong to 100 clients, then a number of instances of client data
is 100. I03, homogeneity, reflects the presence of a correlation
between the numbers of instances of an information asset that
gets disclosed by an incident and the impact of the disclosure.
For instance, “social security numbers” are homogeneous,
since the damage due to the loss of one hundred social security
numbers is larger than the damage due to the loss of a single
social security number. Conversely, an information asset is
nonhomogeneous if the damage due to the disclosure of one
instance is as big as the damage of the disclosure of all
instances. For instance, if the login credentials of one user
get disclosed, the damage to the company is basically the
same as if the credentials of 100 users with equal access
rights would be disclosed. I04, Number of capabilities, is
the number of necessary attributes (out of a predefined set
of attributes, e.g. hacking skills and physical access) that a
threat agent is estimated to have. I05, number of conditions,
is the number of necessary attributes (from the same set of
attributes as in capabilities) to exploit a certain vulnerability
of IT architectural components. I06, level of mitigation, is
the level indicating how well a countermeasure mitigates a
vulnerability.
Impact (I07) and total impact (I08) are indirect quantifica-
tions (calculations) that are achieved by applying respectively
 merge operation on I01 and I02, and ⊕ merge operation on
two distinct variables of I07. I07, impact, is the loss related
with unauthorized disclosure of instances of one information
asset on an IT component. I08, total impact, indicates the
impact of accessing all information assets available on an IT
component.
Finally, risk indicators I09, I10 and I11 are direct quantifi-
cations that are measured in relation to other measurements.
The measurement type of I09 and I10 is proportion, and the
measurement type of I11 is ratio. I09, ease of exploiting vul-
nerabilities, indicates the ease of a potential attacker exploiting
a vulnerability. I10, ease of accessing one component, is the
likelihood of a threat agent disclosing information assets on
one component exploiting the easiest vulnerability. Finally,
I11, protection level of a component is how well an IT
component is protected against the easiest unauthorized access.
B. Analyzing Construct validity of CRAC++
To analyze the construct validity of the CRAC++ method
we determine the scale type that each risk indicator belongs
to.
If quantitative information is not available, then CRAC++
measures confidentiality value in terms of ordered variables
(e.g. high - medium - low). These values are determined based
on the relative business criticality of information assets. So,
they are used to rank the criticality but do not indicate the size
of the interval between variables. Assuming that information
asset i1 is more business critical than information asset i3.
CRAC++ models this relation by representing the confiden-
tiality value of information asset i1 with ordinal variable high
and the confidentiality value of information asset i3 with
the ordinal variable medium. Since the confidentiality value
preserves the relation that is observed among the facts (more
business critical assets have higher value and vise versa) we
claim that the confidentiality value is a meaningful construct.
In the ideal case (when risk assessor has complete knowl-
edge on the information assets) the number of instances belong
to the interval scale. For cost-efficiency reasons we measure
it with the ordinal scale.
Homogeneity consists of two mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive categories, homogenous and nonhomoge-
nous. Therefore, we say that it is of type nominal scale.
Capability and conditions are of nominal scale. Accordingly,
both number of capabilities and number of conditions are from
interval scale.
CRAC++ estimates the level of mitigation with ordinal scale
values (e.g. 1/3 – 2/3 – 3/3). If there is a certain mitigation
mechanism in place that is recommended in best practices
then the mitigation level is 1/3, if there is a mitigation mech-
anism that mitigates worse than the best practices recommend
then the mitigation level is 2/3, other wise (no mitigation
mechanism in place) 3/3. The order of the entities reflect the
empirical mitigation level of the security mechanism but does
not preserve the size of the intervals.
CRAC++ calculates impact by aggravating confidentiality
value, number of instances and homogeneity. Impact belongs
to ordinal scale.
Total impact builds on impact. Since impact is of the ordinal
scale, and total impact is calculated by aggregating the impact
variables, the variables of the total impact are also of the
ordinal scale.
The CRAC++ method estimates ease of exploiting vulner-
abilities by calculating the ratio of number of capabilities
the attacker has over the number of capabilities required for
exploiting the vulnerability. There is an AND relation among
the owned capabilities and necessary capabilities. Furthermore,
there is a positive geometric magnitude between the variables
of ease of exploiting vulnerabilities. The ease increases as the
ratio of owned to necessary capabilities increases. Thus, ease
of exploiting a vulnerability is of type ratio scale.
A further risk indicator is the ease of accessing one com-
ponent. This indicator belongs to the scale type ratio.
The last indicator that we analyze here is the protection level
of a component. This indicator is calculated by comparing ease
of accessing components for different threat agents. Since ease
of accessing one component belongs to scale type ratio, so
does this indicator.
We summarize these findings of Step 2 in Table III.
TABLE III
SCALES TYPES OF THE RISK INDICATORS OF CRAC++.
Risk Indicator Scale type possible values
I01: confidentiality value ordinal scale high–medium–low
I02: number of instances ordinal scale all–single–none
I03: homogeneity nominal scale homogeneous–
nonhomogeneous
I04: number of capabilities interval scale natural numbers
I05: number of conditions interval scale natural numbers
I06: level of mitigation ordinal scale 1/3–2/3–3/3
I07: impact ordinal scale null, high, medium,
low, very high
I08: total impact ordinal scale null, high, medium,
low, very high
I09: ease of exploiting vulner-
abilities
ratio scale positive rational
numbers
I10: ease of accessing one
component
ratio scale positive rational
numbers
I11: protection level of a com-
ponent
ratio scale positive rational
numbers
Next we analyze how well each risk indicator satisfies the
four key characteristics (i.e. accuracy, precision, validity and
correctness).
All risk indicators, accept confidentiality value (I01) and
level of mitigation (I06), obey the accuracy property. If
quantitative information on I01 and I06 was available, these
indicators would also obey the accuracy property. Here, to
minimize the possibility of disagreement, one may use coarse-
grained variables.
There is space for human error only by determining (I10) the
ease of accessing one component. I10 is determined by com-
paring the ease of alternative attack propagation paths, which
are formed based on physical and logical connections among
IT components. Here, if a logical connection is overlooked
this may lead to missing a propagation path and consequently
achieving a wrong variable. Thus, I10 does not satisfy the
precision goal.
Only I07 and I08, impact and total impact, do not satisfy the
completeness goal. This is due to the trade-off between cost of
assessment and completeness. The more complete a method
is the longer it takes to conduct it. CRAC++ addresses this
trade-off by considering only the confidentiality value of the
information assets and ignoring other measures that affect the
impact, e.g. loss of image or penalties to be paid. Total impact
is affected by this optimization, because it is aggregated based
on impact.
All of the indicators of CRAC++ satisfy the correctness
goal. This is due to the high level of formalization CRAC++
provides.
C. Analyzing Aggregation validity of CRAC++
In the following we discuss the meaningfulness of the
merge operators that are elicited at step 1. These operations
formalize the constructs validated at step 2. Due to page
limitations we can not present the formalizations here but the
interested reader may find them in the technical report [8].
Such formalizations aim to facilitate testing the aggradation
validity.
CRAC++ defines  operator to determine the impact.  ag-
gregates the number of instances and the confidentiality values
of the information asset, and formalizes impact. Assuming that
the entities of confidentiality value are high – medium – low
and the entities of number of instances are all – single – non,
the  operator behaves as shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV
BEHAVIOR OF THE  OPERATOR.
 Number of instancesall single none
Conf. value
high very-high high null
medium high medium null
low medium low null
We determined in step 2 that the variables of both confi-
dentiality values and number of instances are of ordinal scale.
To recall from Section II the ordinal scale preserves order and
is monotonic increasing. Since the  operator satisfies these
properties as well, we claim  is aggregation valid.
CRAC++ aggregates total impact by incrementally applying
the ⊕ operator on impact values until all available information
assets are considered. The behavior of ⊕ operator with the
impact values from Table IV is presented in Table V. This
operation formalizes the calculation of total impact.
TABLE V
BEHAVIOR OF THE ⊕ OPERATOR.
⊕ Impactvery-high high medium low null
Im
pa
ct
very-high very-high very-high very-high very-high very-high
high very-high very-high high high high
medium very-high high high medium medium
low very-high high medium medium low
null very-high high medium low null
The scale class of impact is ordinal and this scale preserves
order and is monotonic increasing. Since the ⊕ operator sat-
isfies these properties as well, we claim that ⊕ is aggregation
valid.
CRAC++ calculates ease of accessing one component by
first multiplying the ease of exploiting vulnerabilities of the
component with the level of mitigation estimation, and then
applying the MAX operator on the achieved measurements.
The first aggregation is valid because both of the involved
constructs are of ratio scale and at this scale it is possible
to multiply the entities. The second aggregation is also valid
because it is applicable to variables with positive linear mag-
nitude, and the magnitude of ratio scale extends positive linear
magnitude.
A further construct that is calculated by applying the
MIN/MAX operator is the protection level of a component.
It is calculated by applying the MIN operator on the elements
of the set containing measurements of ease of accessing the
component for all threat agents. Since ratio scale extends or-
dinal scale and monotonic increasing magnitude is a property
of ordinal scale, this operation is also valid.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to avoid potentially expensive mistakes in risk
assessment, the meaningfulness of risk indicators as well as
merge operators need to be validated, based on measurement
theory. In this paper we adapt approaches from the field
of software engineering to IT security RA, and present a
systematic method for validating model based RA methods.
Our analysis shows that measurement theory is applicable to
RA (Q1). However, due to unavailability of quantitative values
for some of the risk measurements, some subjectivity may
be involved in assigning values. We do not intend to address
this aspect of RA here, because although many RA methods
can work with quantitative values, resource constraints ensure
that these methods are not used in practice. To prevent
inconsistency such methods usually define rules for assigning
values. We tested our validation method on CRAC++ using
measurement theory. Since the method provided formaliza-
tions of the risk indicators, we could apply the method easily.
To answer Q2 (repeatability) we plan to apply measurement
theory to other methods that use qualitative values as well.
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